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SUPREME FORESIGHT: JUDICIAL TAKINGS, 
REGULATORY TAKINGS, AND THE PUBLIC 
TRUST DOCTRINE 
Julia K. Bramley* 
Abstract: Before the Supreme Court issued its decision in Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, Inc., v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, many 
expected the Court to finally speak about whether the public trust doc-
trine qualifies as a background principle for modern takings law, and 
whether judicial decisions can constitute an unconstitutional taking. In 
deciding against private property rights and in favor of states’ rights to 
protect their beaches, however, the Supreme Court once again avoided 
finally deciding these issues. Nonetheless, had the Court instead adopted 
the expected “foreseeability” approach to determine whether there was a 
judicial taking, the result would likely have been the same. That is be-
cause the public trust doctrine, which is a background principle of prop-
erty law under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, allows Florida to re-
claim its beaches after a destructive storm and does not unconstitutionally 
take any private property rights. 
Introduction 
 Whether the public trust doctrine has any role in regulatory takings 
analysis is a long-standing debate that exploded on the Supreme Court 
in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.1 Although Justice Scalia’s origi-
nal draft of the majority opinion made no reference to the doctrine, 
Justice Brennan wrote a powerful dissent in which he directly incorpo-
rated the public trust doctrine into the regulatory takings analysis.2 Jus-
tice Blackmun feared that Justice Brennan’s bold assertions would pro-
                                                                                                                      
* Managing Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2010–11. 
1 483 U.S. 825, 846–48 (1987); see generally Memoranda from Ellen E. Deason, Law 
Clerk, to Harry A. Blackmun, Supreme Court Justice, on dissenting opinion in Nollan v. 
Cal. Coastal Comm’n ( June 9–25, 1987) (on file with the Collections of the Manuscript Divi-
sion, Library of Congress). 
2 See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., Supreme Court Justice, First Draft of Dissenting 
Opinion in Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n ( June 3, 1987) (on file with the Collections of the 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress); Antonin Scalia, Supreme Court Justice, First 
Draft of Majority Opinion in Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n ( June 1, 1987) (on file with the 
Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress). 
445 
446 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 38:445 
voke Justice Scalia to retaliate directly by condemning and restricting 
the doctrine, and he was right.3 As an eleventh-hour compromise to 
save the public trust doctrine—facilitated by Justice Blackmun—Justice 
Brennan removed all reference to the public trust doctrine from his dis-
sent and Justice Scalia did not limit the doctrine in the majority opin-
ion.4 Consequently, the only public remnant of this battle is one cryptic 
reference beginning Justice Blackmun’s dissenting opinion stating that 
the Court’s opinion in no way implicated the public trust doctrine.5 
Thus, the Supreme Court remained silent on the public trust doctrine’s 
role in regulatory takings analysis, and lower courts have been left to 
grapple with this divisive issue without guidance ever since.6 
 Over twenty years later, many thought this silence would be broken 
as the Supreme Court wrestled with establishing a third category of tak-
ings that applies to the courts—judicial takings.7 The Court, in Stop the 
Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection 
(Stop the Beach Renourishment II), rendered a decision that once again 
dodged the question of the public trust doctrine’s role in takings analy-
sis, and offered a dramatically different approach to judicial takings 
than had ever been offered before.8 In that case, the Florida Supreme 
Court declared in Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. 
(Stop the Beach Renourishment I ) that property owners suffered no regu-
latory taking of their beachfront property rights, an opinion that rested 
largely on the role of the public trust doctrine in the analysis.9 Affected 
property owners claimed that this decision was an unconstitutional ju-
dicial taking,10 while Florida maintained that no taking occurred.11 
                                                                                                                      
3 See generally Deason, supra note 1 (indicating that Justice Scalia did retaliate against 
the public trust doctrine references in subsequent draft opinions, prompting Justice Bren-
nan to remove all public trust doctrine references from his opinion). 
4 See generally id.; see also Nollan, 483 U.S. at 825–64 (absent reference to public trust 
doctrine). 
5 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 865 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Deason, supra note 1 (in-
sisting it be clear that the majority did not implicate the public trust doctrine). 
6 See infra Parts I–III. 
7See D. Benjamin Barros, What’s at Stake in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Proper-
tyProf Blog ( July 1, 2009), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/property/2009/07/whats-
at-stake-in-stop-the-beach-renourishment.html. 
8 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010). 
9 998 So. 2d 1102, 1114–15 (Fla. 2008), aff’d sub nom., Stop the Beach Renourishment II, 
130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010). 
10 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Stop the Beach Renourishment II, 130 S. Ct. 2592 
(No. 08-1151), 2009 WL 698518 (asking the Supreme Court to decide if there had been a 
judicial taking). 
11 Brief of Respondent in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10–11, Stop 
the Beach Renourishment II, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (No. 08-1151), 2009 WL 1206633. 
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Ironically, it was an opinion penned by Justice Scalia that provided the 
legal hook necessary to assert the public trust doctrine’s role in regula-
tory takings analysis by establishing background principles of state 
law.12 
 If recognized as a legitimate Fifth Amendment protection, a judi-
cial taking will likely require that a court decision be unforeseeable.13 
The decision in Florida, however, was entirely foreseeable because the 
public trust doctrine is well-established as a background principle.14 
Therefore, even if the Supreme Court had adopted a traditional ap-
proach to judicial takings, and addressed the public trust’s role in the 
analysis, the state court decision would still not be found to affect a ju-
dicial taking.15 
 Part I of this Note provides the necessary background on modern 
takings jurisprudence and judicial takings doctrine.16 Part II explains 
how the public trust doctrine has been incorporated into takings analy-
sis.17 Part III elaborates on the Florida Supreme Court’s decision, and 
the United States Supreme Court’s surprising judgment on review.18 
Then, Part IV demonstrates that, even if the United States Supreme 
Court had met expectations and considered the public trust doctrine 
under the foreseeability standard, the Florida Supreme Court would 
still not have affected a judicial taking.19 
I. Takings Analysis Under the Fifth Amendment 
 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment prevents the gov-
ernment from taking “private property . . . for public use, without just 
compensation.”20 This prohibits government from “forcing some peo-
ple alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole.”21 The most traditional ap-
plication of the Fifth Amendment takings protection is when govern-
ment uses its police power to obtain private property through eminent 
                                                                                                                      
12 See generally Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (introducing the 
concept of categorical taking and background principles). 
13 See Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
14 See infra Part II.C.1. 
15 See infra Part IV. 
16 See infra Part I. 
17 See infra Part II. 
18 See infra Part III. 
19 See infra Part IV. 
20 U.S. Const. amend. V. 
21 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978). 
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domain.22 As a basic attribute of sovereignty, all governments have the 
power to physically appropriate private property for a proper public 
purpose.23 Nevertheless, any exercise of eminent domain must be ac-
companied by just compensation—the fair market value of the prop-
erty—for the property owner.24 Thus, although the government can 
sue a private property owner to obtain the owner’s land, the govern-
ment must pay for the land.25 
                                                                                                                     
 The Fifth Amendment also protects private property owners when 
government action takes a property right without going through the 
eminent domain process— “a taking.”26 A property owner who believes 
he is a victim of a taking can sue the government to either stop the ac-
tivity that results in the taking,27 or obtain just compensation for the 
lost property.28 
 A taking can either be a physical taking of property, which is actual 
physical occupation of land,29 or a regulatory taking of property, when 
a government regulation goes “too far” and deprives private property 
owners of reasonable use of their land.30 Some advocate that takings 
protections should also be extended to a third class of government ac-
tivity— “judicial takings.”31 A majority of the modern Supreme Court 
has yet to reach consensus on the subject of applying takings analysis to 
 
22 Zygmunt J.B. Plater et al., Environmental Law and Policy: Nature, Law, and 
Society 1116 (3d ed. 2004). 
23 Id. at 1114–16. “Proper public purpose” does not necessarily mean a government 
use—government can obtain private property through eminent domain and then give it to 
another private owner if the overall purpose of the appropriation is for the public benefit. 
See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 488–92 (2005) (approving gov-
ernment appropriation of private land that is given to a private developer). 
24 Plater, supra note 22, at 1115. 
25 Id. 
26 E.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261–62 (1946); see also Plater, supra note 
22, at 1122–27. 
27 See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (filing suit to enjoin 
government action); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (suing to strike down 
the government regulation that prohibited coal mining in certain areas). 
28 See generally Causby, 328 U.S. at 256 (suing the government to receive just compensa-
tion for the taking of land). 
29 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982). 
30 Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. 
31 See generally David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurection of Custom: Beach Access and Judi-
cial Takings, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1375 (1996) (advocating that expanding the doctrine of cus-
tom in Oregon amounts to a judicial taking); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 Va 
L. Rev. 1449 (1990) (explaining why takings protections should apply to courts as well as 
legislatures and executives); W. David Sarratt, Note, Judicial Takings and the Course Pursued, 90 
Va. L. Rev. 1487 (2004) (arguing that, under the Erie doctrine, state judge-made law should 
be afforded the same takings protections as statutes and regulations). 
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state court decisions, and thus it is unclear what exactly would consti-
tute a judicial taking.32 
A. Physical Takings 
 A physical taking occurs when the government physically occupies 
or appropriates private property.33 Physical takings come in multiple 
forms, including: constructing an airport that leads to air traffic in pri-
vate property’s airspace;34 the nuisance caused by the noise of a nearby 
airport;35 and the placement of a cable television wire on an apartment 
building.36 If the government’s occupation of the land could ripen into 
a prescriptive easement37 over time, then it is likely that the property 
owner has suffered a physical taking and deserves compensation.38 To 
obtain just compensation, a property owner must first establish the 
threshold issue that a physical invasion of property has occurred, and 
then proceed to establish the value of the harm caused by the physical 
occupation.39 
B. Regulatory Takings 
 Not only can government take private property physically, but a 
government regulation that deprives a property owner of a property 
right can also amount to a taking.40 When an owner takes title to land, 
the owner also acquires certain rights inherent in property ownership, 
such as the right to exclude others from the property and the right to 
                                                                                                                      
32 See Stop the Beach Renourishment II, 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2597, 2601–02 (2010) (only a plu-
rality reached a decision on the judicial takings issue); Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 
510 U.S. 1207, 1207 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (majority de-
clined to address judicial takings question); Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 294 
(1967) (Stewart, J., concurring) ( judicial takings central to concurring but not majority 
opinion). 
33 See, e.g., Loretto, 458 U.S. at 437 (requiring a television cable box be put on apart-
ment buildings was a physical taking); Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 376 P.2d 100, 110 
(Or. 1962) (flying planes so close to private property as to oust the owners from quiet en-
joyment of their land results in a physical taking). 
34 Griggs v. Allegheny Cnty., 369 U.S. 84, 89–90 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 
U.S. 256, 261–62 (1946). 
35 Thornburg, 376 P.2d at 100. 
36 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 419. 
37 Plater, supra note 22, at 197. An easement is a right to use land. Id. A prescriptive 
easement is an easement acquired by using land without permission for certain length of 
time, usually five to ten years. Id. 
38 Thornburg, 376 P.2d at 103. 
39 Plater, supra note 22, at 1122. 
40 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
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quiet enjoyment of the property.41 The collection of rights that a prop-
erty owner receives is known as the owner’s “bundle of rights.”42 
 If a regulation goes “too far” in restricting these rights, then the 
owner has suffered a regulatory taking and is entitled to just compensa-
tion.43 To determine if there has been a regulatory taking, courts con-
sider three factors: (1) the economic impact of the regulation; (2) the 
regulation’s interference with distinct investment-backed expectations; 
and (3) the character of the governmental action.44 These factors are 
from the Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York case, and are 
collectively known as the Penn Central balancing test.45 
 However, courts do not always apply the Penn Central balancing test 
in a regulatory takings dispute.46 If a regulation eliminates all eco-
nomically beneficial uses of the land, then the owner has suffered a 
categorical taking and is entitled to compensation without applying the 
multi-factor test.47 Consequently, if a property owner believes that a 
government regulation goes too far in limiting certain property rights, 
then the owner must either satisfy the Penn Central test, or demonstrate 
that the regulation leaves the owner with no economic use of the 
land.48 
mental branches.”50 Thus, state court decisions that favor the state over 
     
C. Judicial Takings: A New Category of Takings? 
 Although the question of what amounts to a physical or regula-
tory taking can be muddled, it is firmly established that the Takings 
Clause limits the extent to which the legislature and executive agen-
cies can infringe upon private property rights.49 Proponents of apply-
ing takings analysis to judicial decisions, which are known as judicial 
takings, fear that without such protection “courts may be motivated to 
accomplish judicially what cannot be accomplished by other govern-
                                                                                                                 
41 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987); Thornburg, 376 P.2d at 103. 
 Meltz et al., The Takings Issue: Constitutional 
Lim se Control and Environmental Regulation 26–27 (1999). 
Plater, supra note 22, at 1154. 
, 1019 (1992). 
would not be made 
 
42 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831; Robert
its on Land U
43 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 123–24. 
44 Id. at 124. 
45 See id.; 
46 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
47 See id. 
48 See id. at 1019; Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 123–24. 
49 Thompson, supra note 31, at 1449. 
50 Roderick E. Walston, The Constitution and Property: Due Process, Regulatory Takings, and 
Judicial Takings, 2001 Utah L. Rev. 379, 437; see also Thompson, supra note 31, at 1502 
(“[B]ecause . . . courts can make valuable changes in the law that 
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private property rights51 would be appealable on the grounds that the 
decision was an unconstitutional taking of property.52 Essentially, judi-
cial changes in the law would be subject to Fifth Amendment protec-
tions.53 
 Those opposed to the prospect of judicial takings protection fo-
cus on the inherent differences between the judiciary and the other 
branches of government,54 the breach such a decision would cause in 
the United States’ federal structure,55 and the impracticality of such a 
doctrine.56 
1. Law of Judicial Takings in Flux 
 Although a majority of the modern Supreme Court has not for-
mally addressed the prospect of judicial takings,57 the issue is not with-
out precedent. The Supreme Court grappled with whether to apply tak-
ings protections to judicial decisions around the turn of the twentieth 
century with inconsistent results.58 Ultimately, the Court “finally and 
flatly reject[ed] the notion that judicial changes in the law could violate 
the takings provisions of the Constitution.”59 Although the issue was 
                                                                                                                      
through other branches of government, it remains useful to consider whether such in-
stan
e would 
pred  See Thompson, supra note 31, at 1450. 
ra note 31, at 1511. 
pra note 31, at 1499. Furthermore, courts do not wield political 
pow
d be overseeing state courts and ruling on areas of traditional 
state
court issues and state courts would be ef-
fect
, 2597, 2601–02 (2010) (only a plural-
ity r
U.S. 226, 233–35 (1897), with Muhlker v. N.Y. & Harlem R.R., 197 U.S. 
544
 
ces call for exempting the courts from the takings protections.”). 
51 See Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296–97 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
Because takings decisions involve government appropriations of private property, and 
property law is traditionally an area of state concern, a judicial takings doctrin
ominantly affect state court decisions.
52 Thompson, sup
53 See id. at 1463. 
54 Courts do not make the law but rather interpret the law. Walston, supra note 50, at 
437–38. Additionally, courts do not have the power of the purse to compensate for judicial 
takings. Thompson, su
er. See id. at 1506. 
55 Federal courts woul
 concern. Id. at 1509. 
56 Federal courts would be flooded with state 
ively stifled from doing their jobs. Id. at 1511. 
57 Stop the Beach Renourishment II, 130 S. Ct. 2592
eached a decision on the judicial takings issue). 
58 See Thompson, supra note 31, at 1463–65. Compare Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. 
City of Chi., 166 
, 568 (1905). 
59 Thompson, supra note 31, at 1465. In 1930, Justice Brandeis emphasized that 
changes in the law did not present constitutional questions. Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. 
Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 680 (1930). In a subsequent case, Justice Cardozo stated that the 
Constitution did not prohibit a court from retroactively applying a change in either com-
mon law or the interpretation of a statute. Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 
358, 364–65 (1932). These statements directly contradict Justice Scalia’s most recent 
statement on the subject that “[o]ur precedents provide no support for the proposition 
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seemingly dead in the 1930s,60 the judicial takings movement was re-
vived in 1967 by Justice Stewart.61 In his concurring opinion in Hughes v. 
Washington, Justice Stewart explained, “a State cannot be permitted to 
defeat the constitutional prohibition against taking property without 
due process of law by the simple device of asserting retroactively that the 
property it has taken never existed at all.”62 
2. Modern Revival of the Judicial Takings Question 
 In the wake of Justice Stewart’s concurrence in Hughes, property 
holders tried to bring judicial takings claims to the Supreme Court, a 
number of state courts declined to overturn precedent for fear that to 
do so would be unconstitutional, and some lower federal courts held 
state court decisions to be unconstitutional takings.63 The Supreme 
Court, however, avoided readdressing the judicial takings question for 
over forty years, until it granted certiorari in Stop the Beach Renourishment 
II.64 
 In the interim, the entire bench did not remain silent on the is-
sue.65 Dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Stevens v. City of Cannon 
Beach, Justice Scalia argued, “[n]o more by judicial decree than by legis-
lative fiat may a State transform private property into public property 
without compensation.”66 Further, Justice Scalia stated plainly his belief 
that a judicial decision that is not grounded in a state’s prior common 
law amounts to an unconstitutional taking.67  
 In Stop the Beach Renourishment II, a four-justice plurality led by Jus-
tice Scalia stated clearly that courts “[a]ffect a taking if they recharac-
terize as public property what was previously private property.”68 In so 
doing, however, these justices flatly rejected the standard laid out in 
Hughes, stating that “[w]hat counts is not whether there is precedent 
                                                                                                                      
that takings affected by the judicial branch are entitled to special treatment” because they 
clearly state that the judiciary cannot affect a taking. Stop the Beach Renourishment II, 130 S. 
Ct. at 2601; see Thompson, supra note 31, at 1465. 
60 Thompson, supra note 31, at 1468. 
61 See Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296–97 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
62 Id. 
63 Thompson, supra note 31, at 1469–71. 
64 See 130 S. Ct. at 2601. 
65 See generally Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari). 
66 Id. at 1212. 
67 Id. 
68 Stop the Beach Renourishment II, 130 S. Ct. at 2601. The remaining justices declined to 
reach a decision on the issue. Id. at 2613, 2618. 
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for the allegedly confiscatory decision,” but whether the court “declares 
that what was once an established right of private property no longer 
exists.”69 This standard is a sharp deviation from what was previously 
thought of as a judicial taking,70 has no precedential value,71 and could 
be difficult to apply.72 In the end, it is likely that applying the “estab-
lished property right” standard will require employing tests similar to 
those advocated in Hughes, even though the Hughes standard was seem-
gly
                                                                                                                     
in  rejected.73 
 While the issue of judicial takings has been revived, what consti-
tutes a judicial taking is still unclear.74 As of now, the clearest articula-
tion of a judicial taking is paraphrased from Justice Stewart’s Hughes 
concurrence: “the [State] Supreme Court’s decision must be granted 
deference as long as it ‘conforms to reasonable expectations,’ but ‘to 
the extent that it constitutes a sudden change in state law, unpredict-
able in terms of the relevant precedents, no such deference would be 
appropriate.’”75 The crux of judicial takings under this test rests on 
whether or not the state court decision was foreseeable.76 This standard 
was rejected, however, in Stop the Beach Renourishment II, where the al-
ternative “established property right” test was proposed.77 Currently 
neither standard has precedential value, and it is unclear whether ei-
ther will be adopted in the future.78 It is possible, though, that deciding 
 
le L.J. Online 
247, 
10) (de-
clin
lying that, 
afte
akings claim will fail if the contested decision is rea-
sona
 supra note 31, at 1522–41 (addressing the problems with defining a 
judi
hes 
dec
ey, supra note 70, at 255; Walston, supra note 50, at 432; Sarratt, supra 
note
0 S. Ct. 2592, 2602 (2010). 
69 Id. at 2602, 2610. 
70 See Timothy M. Mulvaney, The New Judicial Takings Construct, 120 Ya
250–51 (2011), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/946.pdf. 
71 Sagarin v. City of Bloomington, 932 N.E.2d. 739, 744 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 20
ing to follow plurality decision because it is “without precedential authority”). 
72 See Mulvaney, supra note 70, at 256 (stating that the standard in Stop the Beach Renour-
ishment “falls prey to . . . malleability: it offers scant directives to future courts required to 
determine the bounds of ‘established’ property rights”); Daniel S. Siegel, Why We Will Prob-
ably Never See A Judicial Takings Doctrine, 35 Vt. L. Rev. 459, 471–72 (2010) (imp
r Stop the Beach Renourishment, the judicial takings test is extremely unclear). 
73 See D. Benjamin Barros, The Complexities of Judicial Takings, 45 U. Rich. L. Rev. 903, 
934 (2011) (stating that a judicial t
bly based on prior precedent). 
74 See Thompson,
cial taking). 
75 Walston, supra note 50, at 432 (quoting Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 295–96 
(1967) (Stewart, J., concurring)); see Barros, supra note 73, at 911 (stating that the Hug
ision is the clearest articulation of a judicial taking); Sarratt, supra note 31, at 1533. 
76 See Mulvan
 31, at 1533. 
77 Stop the Beach Renourishment II, 13
78 See Siegel, supra note 72, at 474. 
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the “establish ng the fore-
ood, that is, 
 le
had full title to the property interest allegedly taken.89 A regulation de-
priving the owner of that property interest does not take anything that 
                                                                                                                     
ed property right” standard will require applyi
seeability standard already outlined in Hughes.79 
D. Categorical Takings and Background Principles 
 Determining whether a regulation results in a categorical taking 
requires an analysis of background principles of law, one of which is the 
public trust doctrine.80 The Penn Central balancing test was the standard 
applied in all regulatory takings cases until 1992.81 Then, in Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, penned by Justice Scalia, the Supreme 
Court established the categorical takings standard.82 In that case, a 
coastal landowner in South Carolina intended to develop his land, but 
the South Carolina Coastal Council subsequently enacted a regulation 
that prevented any development of the land.83 In deciding whether this 
amounted to a regulatory taking, the Supreme Court stated that an 
“owner of real property [who] has been called upon to sacrifice all 
economically beneficial uses in the name of the common g
to ave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.”84 In 
such cases, the court can determine that a per se taking has occurred 
without needing to apply the three-part Penn Central test.85 
 This test is not absolute; courts must first engage in a threshold 
inquiry as to whether the proscribed use interests were initially a part of 
the owner’s title.86 The Court recognized that certain background prin-
ciples of the state’s laws of property or nuisance are inherent in the title 
to land.87 A law or regulation that does “no more than duplicate the 
result that could have been achieved in the courts,” because of inher-
ent background principles, does not constitute a taking and the prop-
erty owner need not be compensated.88 Thus, if a background princi-
ple of state law encumbers an owner’s property, then the owner never 
 
l Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 1019 (1992); Penn Cent. 
Tra Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
015, 1019. 
7. 
029. 
79 See generally Barros, supra note 73. 
80 See infra Part II. 
81 See Lucas v. S.C. Coasta
nsp. Co. v. City of N.
82 505 U.S. at 1
83 Id. at 1006–0
84 Id. at 1019. 
85 Id. at 1015. 
86 Id. at 1027. 
87 Id. at 1
88 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. 
89 See id. 
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the owner ever had to lose.90 The Court, however, left the meaning of 
“background principles of the State’s law of property” open to interpre-
tio
octrine or law may interfere with investment-backed ex-
pectations.99 
                                                                                                                     
ta n.91 
 Nevertheless, a series of decisions established several criteria to 
guide lower courts in determining what constitutes a background prin-
ciple: (1) it must be a state, not federal, law or doctrine;92 (2) the law or 
doctrine “cannot be newly legislated or decreed”;93 (3) the restriction 
must no more than duplicate what could have been achieved in the 
courts;94 (4) the restriction must apply to all landowners;95 and (5) the 
law or doctrine must not vacillate or have an ambiguous application.96 
These five factors are collectively referred to as the Lucas factors. When 
these factors are satisfied, then a law or doctrine inheres in the title of 
any property owner who holds that property subject to that law or doc-
trine—that is to say, the property owner never had full title to that 
property to begin with.97 Further, background principles also have a 
role in the Penn Central balancing test to determine whether there has 
been a regulatory taking when public resources are at issue.98 This is 
because the d
II. The Public Trust Doctrine as a Background Principle 
 Since the Supreme Court established the categorical takings stan-
dard and the idea of background principles, legal scholars have argued 
that the public trust doctrine qualifies as a background principle.100 
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The Supreme Court has not addressed the role of the public trust doc-
trine in regulatory takings analysis,101 but many lower courts agree that 
the public trust doctrine is a background principle.102 
state’s obliga-
on
                                                                                                                     
A. The Public Trust Doctrine 
 Based on ideas originating with the Roman Emperor Justinian,103 
the Supreme Court identified the public trust doctrine as substantive 
state common law early in the Nation’s history.104 The public trust doc-
trine vests states with the duty to hold public resources in trust for the 
people of the state.105 In Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, the Court ad-
vanced the public trust doctrine by recognizing that the doctrine im-
poses certain constraints on state action.106 A State cannot relinquish 
the trust simply by transferring title to public trust lands because the 
state’s obligations under the trust are analogous to the 
ti s to exercise police powers to preserve the peace.107 
 By the end of the twentieth century, the doctrine had expanded 
from its limited application to navigable and tidal waters to include 
lakes, tributaries, riparian banks, aquifers, marshes, wetlands, springs, 
groundwater,108 beach access,109 trees and forests,110 parks,111 wild-
life,112 fossil beds,113 and entire ecosystems.114 Further, the public trust 
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101 See generally Stop the Beach Renourishment II, 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2597 (2010) (referencing 
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102 See infra Part II.C. 
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104 Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 413 (1842) (“[T]he shores,
s of the sea, and the land under them, [were to be] held as a public trust for the bene-
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doctrine has been codified by many states, either in their constitutions, 
via statute, or both.115 In sum, the public trust doctrine is a state com-
mon law doctrine, which is also expressed in the constitutions and stat-
tes 
 protected by the public 
trust doctrine expand to meet those needs.121 
. T
cess,122 water use,123 navigable waters,124 tidelands,125 forests,126 and 
                                                                                                                     
u of many states.116 
 The increasingly expansive reach of the public trust doctrine is a 
function of evolving communal obligations— “[t]he public trust doc-
trine, like all common law principles, should not be considered fixed or 
static, but should be molded and extended to meet changing condi-
tions and needs of the public it was created to benefit.”117 The fusion of 
the public trust doctrine and evolving communal values necessarily im-
plicates the relationship between the public and the public’s use and 
enjoyment of land.118 Thus, various state legislatures and state agencies 
have relied on public trust obligations to justify limiting the use and 
development of lands encumbered by the public trust doctrine.119 As 
one observer noted, “[a]s the public trust doctrine has gradually ex-
panded to ‘meet changing conditions and needs of the public,’ so have 
land use restrictions gradually grown to encompass historically consis-
tent, but nevertheless novel, natural resources.”120 As the needs and 
values of communities change, the resources
B he Public Trust Doctrine’s Historical Role in Regulatory Takings Analysis 
 In both public court decisions and unpublicized arguments, 
judges and justices alike have endorsed the public trust doctrine’s role 
in takings analysis. Courts have relied on public trust principles to re-
strict private property rights in a variety of settings, including beach ac-
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subaqueous oil resources.127 The Supreme Court even acknowledged 
that the public trust doctrine encumbers private title to land.128 In Phil-
lips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, the Court held that Mississippi had ac-
quired title to all lands beneath waters subject to tides, not just naviga-
ble waters.129 In writing for the majority, Justice White recognized that 
“[s]tates have the authority to . . . recognize private rights in [public 
trust] lands as they see fit.”130 Thus, the Court made clear that the pub-
lic trust doctrine reaches beyond the traditional navigable waters 
boundary,131 and that states have a claim to privately owned property 
that is encumbered by the public trust doctrine.132 
 The Supreme Court has also directly grappled with the public trust 
doctrine’s role in regulatory takings.133 Justice Brennan’s first draft of 
his dissent in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission explicitly endorsed 
the limits that the public trust doctrine imposes on a property owner’s 
title to land.134 Justice Brennan began by explaining that the relevant 
California statutes merely duplicate what could have been accom-
plished under the public trust doctrine.135 Justice Brennan pointed out 
that: 
States have come to recognize the need to undertake regula-
tion in order to preserve the character of, and public access 
to, their coastal areas . . . [and] States have come to acknowl-
edge that the public’s use of public trust property encom-
passes more than the traditional purposes of commerce, navi-
gation, and fishing . . . [s]uch regulation is now more 
appropriately regarded as an employment of the police power 
for this particular purpose.136 
Justice Brennan also explained that the California Constitution adopted 
the public trust doctrine explicitly137 and that this provision is “suffi-
ciently flexible to encompass changing public needs.”138 
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 Justice Brennan concluded that the bundle of rights enjoyed by 
coastal property owners is subject to and subservient to the public trust 
doctrine; California property owners did not have “the right to use 
their property in any way that might impede public access to the 
beach.”139 Thus, Justice Brennan’s entire argument that there was no 
unconstitutional action in Nollan was premised upon establishing that 
the public trust doctrine was inherent in the title of coastal property 
owners and the owners’ rights being “qualified” by the public trust doc-
trine.140 In other words, the public trust doctrine was relevant to the 
regulatory takings analysis.141 
C. Lower Courts Find the Public Trust Doctrine to Be a Background Principle 
 The categorical takings standard, limited by background principles 
such as the public trust doctrine, dramatically altered the takings land-
scape by giving both plaintiffs and defendants two additional factors to 
consider in a takings dispute.142 Plaintiffs could circumvent the Penn 
Central balancing test by demonstrating a complete loss of economically 
beneficial use of the property.143 Defendants could defend against a 
takings claim by demonstrating that the owner’s title was burdened by a 
background principle so the owner never held the property claimed to 
have been lost.144 Lower courts have found that the public trust doc-
trine is a background principle in both the categorical and regulatory 
taking scenarios. 
1. Public Trust Doctrine as a Background Principle 
 Several courts have explicitly held that the public trust doctrine is 
a background principle in categorical takings.145 The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, in Esplanade Properties, LLC v. City of Seattle, stated un-
ambiguously that Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council “effectively rec-
ognized the public trust doctrine” as a background principle.146 The 
Ninth Circuit then relied on the doctrine to find that restricting devel-
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140 Brennan, supra note 2, at 14. 
141 Id. at 1–14. 
142 See Walston, supra note 50, at 400; see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
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opment of shoreline property near a public park was not a categorical 
taking, even though there was no other beneficial use of the property, 
because the development plans “never constituted a legally permissible 
lic trust doctrine is a 
ack
                                                                                                                     
use” of the property.147 
 Similarly, in McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the South 
Carolina Supreme Court held that compensation for a landowner who 
had lost all economically beneficial use of his property was unneces-
sary.148 The property in question was “public trust property subject to 
the control of the State,” and therefore no taking had occurred when 
the landowner was denied a permit to do what he could not otherwise 
have done because of the public trust doctrine.149 Thus, courts at the 
state and federal level have found that the pub
b ground principle under the Lucas factors.150 
 Beyond categorical takings, lower courts have also found the pub-
lic trust doctrine relevant to the Penn Central balancing test.151 In Palaz-
zolo v. Rhode Island, on remand from the Supreme Court, a Rhode Is-
land court explicitly declared that the public trust doctrine is a 
background principle that “substantially impacts Plaintiff’s title to the 
parcel in question and has a direct relationship to Plaintiff’s reasonable 
investment-backed expectations.”152 Similarly, New Jersey recognized 
that a landowner’s rights to trust property were limited by the public 
trust doctrine.153 Because “the sovereign never waives its right to regu-
late the use of public trust property,” the landowner “had notice in ad-
vance of [his] investment decision” that government regulations had 
been, or would be, enacted on the property.154 The public trust doc-
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614, 617 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007) (reaffirming that the public trust doctrine is a background 
principle and stating that land owners cannot claim title to land up to the water’s edge 
when they artificially caused the land to expand). 
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(1999); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 494 (Haw. 2000); Harrison v. Va. 
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trine also restricts the rights of lakeshore property owners, thus confer-
ring a right of public access across lakeshore property.155 In 2009, the 
Supreme Court of Florida, in Stop the Beach Renourishment I, Inc., recog-
nized the public trust doctrine as a background principle in ruling that 
a Florida statute did not affect a regulatory taking of property rights of 
coastal land owners.156 
E
epends on the property laws in a state 
hic
always been implied under 
ck
                                                                                                                     
2. xceptions to the Public Trust Doctrine as a Background Principle 
 The public trust doctrine has not achieved total recognition as a 
background principle.157 In certain fact-specific situations, courts have 
refused to qualify the public trust doctrine as a background principle: 
(1) when a well-settled state regulation is directly contrary to the doc-
trine; (2) when a regulation codifying the doctrine limits use of prop-
erty beyond the doctrine’s widely accepted boundaries;158 and (3) 
when a case in federal court d
w h has not spoken on the issue.159 
 The first scenario is illustrated by Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage 
District v. United States.160 The United States Court of Federal Claims did 
not recognize the public trust doctrine as a background principle be-
cause California had explicitly authorized the unrestricted use of water 
that the public trust doctrine would have restricted.161 The court would 
“not be making explicit that which had 
ba ground principles of property law.”162 
 Similarly, illustrating the second scenario, the Supreme Court of 
New Hampshire would not recognize the public trust doctrine as a 
background principle when a statute codifying the public trust doctrine 
was inconsistent with New Hampshire’s traditional understanding of 
the doctrine.163 In Purdie v. Attorney General, the statute passed by the 
state legislature “went beyond the[] common law limits by extending 
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Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 324 (2001); Purdie v. Att’y Gen., 732 
A.2d 442, 447 (N.H. 1999). 
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159 Severance, 566 F.3d at 502–03. 
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161 Id. at 323–24. 
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163 See Purdie v. Att’y Gen., 732 A.2d 442, 447 (N.H. 1999). 
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public trust rights to the highest high water mark” when traditional 
public trust rights only established “public ownership of the shorelands 
to the mean high water mark.”164 The doctrine, as codified by the legis-
lature, would not have achieved the same results that could have been 
hi
recognizing the public trust doctrine as a back-
ground principle.170 
III. Stop the Beac he Question of a 
                                                                                                                     
ac eved in the courts.165 
 Finally, illustrating the third scenario, the Fifth Circuit declined to 
decide whether the public trust doctrine was a background principle of 
Texas’ property law because Texas had not spoken on the issue.166 In 
Severance v. Patterson, to determine whether there was an unconstitu-
tional taking of property rights when the Texas legislature declared a 
“rolling easement”167 along the Gulf Coast, the Fifth Circuit asked the 
Texas Supreme Court whether the easement was based on the public 
trust doctrine or was created by the statute.168 Thus, this case does not 
actually suggest that the public trust doctrine is not a background prin-
ciple, but rather that in order to be declared as such the relevant state 
court precedent must be clear.169 In sum, the three instances in which 
the public trust doctrine was not recognized as a background principle 
are factually unique situations, and clear anomalies to the overwhelm-
ing trend of courts 
h Renourishment II Raises t
Judicial Taking in Florida 
 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in Stop 
the Beach Renourishment II to decide whether the Florida Supreme Court’s 
decision resulted in a judicial taking.171 The Florida Supreme Court 
declared a statute to be so grounded in the public trust doctrine that 
the property rights limited by the statute were never present in the 
owner’s title to begin with.172 The property owners appealed the deci-
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167 A rolling easement is an easement that changes as the vegetation line on the coast 
changes. Id. at 493. The public has a right to use the wet and dry san
etation line, and this e
168 See id. a
169 See id. 
170 Kleinsasser, supra note 90, at 444. 
171 Stop the Beach Renourishment II, 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2600–01 (2010). 
172 See Stop the Beach Renourishment I, 998 So. 
., Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. 2592. 
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sion claiming that it was a judicial taking.173 Before one can understand 
the nuances of the Florida court’s decision, however, it is necessary to 
establish a foundation in Florida’s coastal property law. 
A. A Brief Survey of Florida State Land Law 
. R
t to use the water, and the 
accretion or reliction be-
littoral owner’s land through erosion182 is lost from the land owner’s 
1 ights to Land Bordering Water: Littoral Rights 
 In general, property owners in the eastern United States, who own 
land that touches a body of water, including rivers, lakes, and the 
ocean, own title to the land with certain rights commonly referred to as 
riparian174 or littoral rights.175 Common littoral rights include the right 
to have water pass in its natural state, the righ
right to an unobstructed view of the water.176 
 In Florida, coastal owners “hold several special or exclusive com-
mon law littoral rights: (1) the right to have access to the water; (2) the 
right to reasonably use the water; (3) the right to accretion and relic-
tion; and (4) the right to an unobstructed view of the water.”177 Accre-
tion occurs when the littoral owner’s land is increased “‘by the gradual 
deposit, by water, of solid material, whether mud, sand, or sediment, so 
as to cause that to become dry land which was before covered by wa-
ter.’”178 Reliction, on the other hand, refers to land that becomes dry 
land due to the removal of water instead of the build up of soil.179 In 
Florida, any new dry land created because of 
comes part of the littoral land owner’s title.180 
 The opposite is also true, however.181 Any land that is lost from a 
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title. Land lost from the littoral owner’s title, because it is no longer dry 
land, becomes subject to the public trust doctrine and the protections 
of the state.183 The distinctive feature of land that is gained or lost from 
the coast due to accretion, reliction, or erosion, is the imperceptible 
change that occurs over a long period of time.184 
 The boundary between the littoral owner’s land and the land sub-
ject to the public trust doctrine, is the mean high water line 
(MHWL).185 Because the MHWL regularly changes, due to the ebbs 
and flows and the tide, this boundary is known as a dynamic bound-
ary.186 Thus, as more dry land is created due to accretion and reliction, 
the MHWL moves towards the water creating more land for the littoral 
owner.187 Correspondingly, as dry land is lost due to the process of ero-
sion, the MHWL moves towards the littoral owner’s property, reducting 
the littoral owner’s land.188 
                                                                                                                     
 However, not all landscape changes on the coasts happen imper-
ceptibly over a long span of time.189 Avulsion is “the sudden or percep-
tible loss of or addition to land by the action of the water or a sudden 
change in the bed of a lake or the course of a stream.”190 If the change 
in the land is due to avulsion, and not accretion, reliction, or erosion, 
then the MHWL does not change regardless of the different coast-
line.191 Thus, if more land is created suddenly due to avulsion, and not 
gradually due to accretion or reliction, then the title to the new land 
lies with the state.192 Likewise, if land is lost due to sudden avulsion, 
instead of gradual erosion, then the land lost is the state’s land and not 
the littoral owner’s land.193 In addition, when land is lost due to avul-
sion, the affected property owners have the right to reclaim the lost 
land within a reasonable time.194 
 
182 Erosion is the “wearing away of something by action of the elements; esp., the 
gradual eating away of soil by the operation of currents or tides.” Black’s Law Diction-
ary 621 (9th ed. 2009). 
183 The public trust doctrine encumbers all lands that lie beneath navigable waters. See 
supra notes 103–116 and accompanying text. 
184 Stop the Beach Renourishment I, 998 So. 2d at 1113–14. 
185 The MHWL is determined based on where the average high-tide line sits over a 
nineteen-year period. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 177.27(14) (West 2000). 
186 Stop the Beach Renourishment I, 998 So. 2d at 1112. 
187 See id. at 1113–14. 
188 See id. 
189 Id. at 1113. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 1114. 
192 See Stop the Beach Renourishment I, 998 So. 2d at 1114. 
193 See id. 
194 Id. at 1117. 
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2. Florida’s Beach and Shore Preservation Act 
 In 1961, Florida’s legislature adopted a comprehensive statutory 
scheme to protect the coasts, which included the Beach and Shore 
Preservation Act (BSPA) to address the problems associated with ero-
sion.195 The statute provides a mechanism for Florida to restore and 
renourish critically eroded beaches.196 The Florida Department of En-
vironmental Protection is charged with “determin[ing] ‘those beaches 
which are critically eroded and in need of restoration’” and “‘au-
thoriz[ing] appropriations to pay up to 75 percent of the actual costs 
for restoring and renourishing a critically eroded beach.’”197 
 Under the statute, when a local government applies for funding, a 
survey of the shoreline is conducted to determine the MHWL for the 
area.198 After the MHWL is established, the erosion control line (ECL) 
is determined, and this represents the area to be protected by the res-
toration project.199 The MHWL—the boundary between public and 
private property—is considered when determining the ECL, but it is 
not a controlling factor and the restoration project could include pri-
vate property.200 
 The ECL is the new boundary between public and private coastal 
property once it is recorded, regardless of whether restoration has be-
gun or not.201 At this point, “the common law no longer operates ‘to 
increase or decrease the proportions of any upland property lying 
landward of such line, either by accretion or erosion or by any other 
natural or artificial process.’”202 Although the right of accretion and the 
right for the coastal land owner’s property to touch the water are 
eliminated, all other littoral rights are preserved under the BSPA.203 
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required to prevent erosion.”). Furthermore, “the State has no intention ‘to extend its 
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and constitutional use and enjoyment of his or her property.’” Id. (quoting § 161.141). 
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3. The Florida Supreme Court’s Decision in Stop the Beach Renourishment I 
 In 1995, following coastal damage from Hurricane Opal, Destin 
and Walton Counties filed permits to repair the beaches.204 Stop the 
Beach Renourishment, Inc. (STBR), a not-for-profit association consist-
ing of six owners of beachfront property in the area of the proposed 
project,205 quickly challenged the decision on procedural and constitu-
tional grounds.206 STBR claimed that section 161.191(1) of the BSPA 
was unconstitutional because is severed common law littoral rights from 
coastal owners—in other words, the action of Destin and Walton Coun-
ties, pursuant to the BSPA, affected a regulatory taking.207 On July 3, 
2006, a Florida appeals court certified the following question to the 
Florida Supreme Court: “On its face, does the Beach and Shore Preser-
vation Act unconstitutionally deprive upland owners of littoral rights 
without just compensation?”208 
 The Florida Supreme Court found that there was no taking at all 
because the BSPA merely reflected what could have been done under 
common law.209 The common law, the court said, balanced the public 
and private “interests in [the] ever-changing shoreline.”210 The State is 
interested in protecting the beaches, and allowing public access to the 
beaches, whereas property owners are interested in conserving their 
littoral property rights.211 
 The court began the discussion of common law with an acknowl-
edgment that the public trust doctrine required the State to “own and 
hold the lands under navigable waters for the benefit of the people.”212 
Furthermore, the Florida Constitution required the State to conserve 
and protect the entire beach as a natural resource and to fulfill its obli-
gation under the public trust doctrine.213 
 As stated above, the MHWL—the boundary between private and 
public land—shifts to account for accretion and reliction but stays stag-
nant when the coast is altered because of avulsion.214 This, the court 
reasoned, is the mechanism employed by the common law to balance 
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the competing interests of the public obligations and private rights to 
coastal property.215 Coastal owners get the benefit of accretion and 
reliction when the MHWL moves to accommodate the change, whereas 
the public is benefitted by the MHWL remaining stationary after an 
avulsive event.216 
 The BSPA, the court stated, achieves this same balance.217 The 
BSPA allows the State to fulfill its duty to protect the beaches, while 
serving private interests by protecting private property from future 
storm damage and erosion, and conserving the view of the water.218 
Furthermore, coastal land owners retain their present littoral rights to 
use, access, and view the water.219 In particular, the act of fixing the 
ECL and suspending the common law rule of accretion is constitu-
tional when considered with the common law rule of avulsion.220 
                                                                                                                     
 Unlike accretion, when there is an avulsive event the boundary 
between public and private property does not change and the party 
that lost land due to avulsion has a right to reclaim the land.221 Hurri-
canes are considered avulsion-causing events.222 Thus, because trust 
lands were lost due to avulsion, the State could take reasonable steps to 
restore those lands and reclaim title, which is what the BSPA author-
izes.223 
 The Florida Supreme Court also disposed of the lower court’s ar-
guments by demonstrating that the doctrine of accretion is not impli-
cated by the BSPA because it is a right that is contingent on other fac-
tors intended to balance the interests of the public and private rights to 
the water.224 These factors, according to the court, are not implicated 
under the statute.225 Thus, because the right to accretion and reliction 
is a future right that only materializes under specific conditions, which 
were not triggered in this case, that right could not be taken because it 
did not yet exist.226 
 
215 See Stop the Beach Renourishment I, 998 So. 2d at 1114. 
216 See id. 
217 Id. at 1115. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. 
220 Id. at 1116. 
221 See supra notes 191–194 and accompanying text. 
222 Stop the Beach Renourishment I, 998 So. 2d at 1116. 
223 See id. 
224 Id. at 1118. 
225 Id. 
226 See id. at 1119. 
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 Finally, the court stated that under Florida common law, the right 
to have direct contact with the water is ancillary to the right to access 
the water.227 There is no explicit littoral right to contact the water in 
Florida.228 To the extent that there is, it only exists to ensure that prop-
erty owners have access to the water.229 Because the right to access the 
water is not threatened by the BSPA, there was no loss by not having 
actual contact with the water.230 The court ultimately held that the right 
of coastal landowners to have their property touch the water’s edge was 
subject to the public trust doctrine and, thus, not inherent in their ti-
tle.231 
4. The United States Supreme Court’s Decision in Stop the Beach 
Renourishment II 
 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Stop the 
Beach Renourishment II to determine whether a judicial taking, or any 
other kind of taking, had occurred.232 In a unanimous decision, the 
Court held that no taking had occurred, finding the Florida common 
law of avulsion clear, and that the state’s right to fill its submerged land 
was superior to any private rights to future accretions and contact with 
the water.233 
 This decision was a surprise to many, who predicted that the deci-
sion would come out five-to-four in favor of the private property own-
ers.234 Further, it was expected that Justice Scalia’s majority opinion 
would condemn the public trust doctrine’s role in takings analysis, and 
use the test outlined in Hughes v. Washington to firmly establish a judi-
cial takings doctrine.235 The reverberations of such a decision would 
have reached far beyond land use disputes with coastal property own-
ers, and would have affected private property disputes of any kind.236 
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Instead, the Court once again failed to decide whether the public trust 
doctrine had a role in takings analysis, and proposed an entirely new 
judicial takings standard around which Justice Scalia was not able to 
garner a majority.237 
IV. Florida Supreme Court Did Not Commit a Judicial Taking 
Under Any Standard 
 The Supreme Court surprised many when deciding Stop the Beach 
Renourishment II.238 Not only did the Court decide against private prop-
erty rights, but it did not speak about the role of the public trust doc-
trine in takings analysis, nor did the justices reach consensus about ju-
dicial takings, or even articulate a traditional judicial takings test.239 
Even if the Court reached its decision based on a traditional approach 
to judicial takings and the public trust doctrine, the Florida Supreme 
Court decision would still not have amounted to a judicial taking.240 To 
constitute a judicial taking under pre-Stop the Beach Renourishment II doc-
trine, a decision must be “a sudden change” and “unpredictable.”241 
Thus, if the decision was foreseeable, then it is unlikely to be a judicial 
taking.242 The Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Stop the Beach Re-
nourishment I was foreseeable because: (1) the public trust doctrine is a 
background principle under the Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 
factors, generally and in Florida; and (2) the limits placed on private 
property by the public trust doctrine were established well before the 
concept of background principles was articulated by the Court. 
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A. The Public Trust Doctrine Is a Background Principle in Florida Law 
 It is not surprising that the public trust doctrine is declared a 
background principle by any state because, even theoretically, the pub-
lic trust doctrine satisfies the Lucas factors.243 Consider the following: 
(1) the public trust doctrine is a state doctrine;244 (2) the public trust 
doctrine is a settled rule of law that has even been codified in many 
states;245 (3) any restraint on private actions that jeopardize public trust 
resources merely duplicates what could have been achieved in the 
courts;246 (4) the doctrine applies to all landowners equally, because 
any owner of trust resources holds title subservient to the public inter-
est;247 and (5) the public trust doctrine does not vacillate, because the 
doctrine has continuously and predictably expanded throughout our 
Nation’s history.248 Thus, any restriction of property rights that has its 
roots in the public trust doctrine was not, to begin with, part of the 
landowner’s original title.249 The Florida Supreme Court’s holding that 
the public trust doctrine fulfilled each of the Lucas factors in Stop the 
Beach Renourishment I was therefore entirely foreseeable.250 
 The Florida Supreme Court began the discussion by emphasizing 
that the public trust doctrine is part of Florida’s common law, has been 
adopted by Florida’s constitution, and the BSPA was enacted to carry 
                                                                                                                      
243 Kleinsasser, supra note 90, at 432–37; see also Archer, supra note 121, at 78 (stating 
that the public trust doctrine is one of the most traditional common law property princi-
ples); Meltz, supra note 42, at 376–77 (suggesting that the public trust doctrine is a back-
ground principle and a defense against a takings claim). The Lucas factors are the five 
factors established by the Supreme Court as elements of a background principle. See supra 
notes 92–97 and accompanying text. 
244 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 473 (1988); Martin v. 
Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 413 (1842) (“[T]he shores, and rivers and bay, and arms of the sea, 
and the land under them, [were to be] held as a public trust for the benefit of the whole 
community . . . .”); Brennan, supra note 2, at 5. 
245 Craig, supra note 115, at 1. 
246 See, e.g., Kleinsasser, supra note 90, at 434; Patrick A. Parenteau, Unreasonable Expecta-
tions: Why Palazzolo Has No Right to Turn a Silk Purse into a Sow’s Ear, 30 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. 
Rev. 101, 117 (2002) (stating that when Rhode Island passed a regulation protecting coastal 
resources it made explicit what had formerly been implicit—the public trust doctrine). 
247 See Paul Sarahan, Wetlands Protection Post-Lucas: Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine 
on Takings Analysis, 13 Va. Envtl. L.J. 537, 557 (1994). 
248 See Archer, supra note 121 (“[A]lthough the core of the public trust doctrine has 
remained stable over the past two centuries, it shares the inherent common law capacity to 
grow and adapt.”). 
249 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–30 (1992); Kleinsasser, supra 
note 90, at 432–37. 
250 See supra notes 242–248 and accompanying text. 
2011] Stop the Beach Renourishment, Judicial Takings, & the Public Trust 471 
out Florida’s public trust duties—satisfying the first two factors.251 The 
third Lucas factor was satisfied because the BSPA merely duplicated 
what could have been achieved at common law due to the balance be-
tween accretion and avulsion.252 Specifically, “the Act effectuates the 
State’s constitutional duty to protect Florida’s beaches . . . .”253 Next, 
the BSPA applies to all coastal property in Florida so it affects all coastal 
owners equally—satisfying the fourth factor.254 Finally, the duty to pro-
tect Florida coasts in such a way has existed since Florida was admitted 
to the Union as a state,255 and was recognized by Florida courts as early 
as 1912.256 Thus, as applied here, the public trust doctrine has been 
fairly static in its role protecting beaches.257 Given the public trust doc-
trine’s role as a background principle generally, and in Stop the Beach 
Renourishment I specifically, it is entirely foreseeable that the public trust 
doctrine would place restrictions on an owner’s title to land in the 
manner outlined in Lucas.258 
 That this decision was foreseeable is amplified because the BSPA 
was enacted in 1961.259 One judicial takings scholar has argued that 
“statutory law, if enacted long ago, may itself form part of the state’s 
‘background’ principles of law.”260 Therefore, even if the common law 
public trust doctrine does not restrict an owner’s title in the manner 
articulated in Stop the Beach Renourishment I, the BSPA itself is so long-
established in Florida that it has also become a background princi-
ple.261 With both the BSPA and the common law public trust doctrine 
functioning as background principles of Florida property law, it is cer-
tainly predictable that these principles would place restrictions on 
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coastal owners’ title to land.262 At the very least, the longevity of the 
BSPA implies the probability that the statute would be enforced.263 
 In sum, the public trust doctrine easily satisfies the five Lucas fac-
tors, making the doctrine a background principle that places limits on 
an owner’s title to land.264 The common law and statutory public trust 
doctrine function as background principles of Florida property law that 
place limits on the title of coastal land owners.265 Thus, it is fully fore-
seeable that the Florida Supreme Court would recognize these restric-
tions on coastal land owners’ titles and find that the BSPA does not af-
fect a regulatory taking.266 
B. Public Trust Doctrine Is Long Established and Thus Foreseeable 
 The restrictions that the public trust doctrine can place on an 
owner’s title to land even pre-date the establishment of the background 
principle concept in Lucas.267 The substantial case history268 and Justice 
Brennan’s unpublished dissenting opinion in Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission serve as further evidence that the Stop the Beach Renourish-
ment I decision was predictable.269 
 The public trust doctrine has restricted an owner’s title to land for 
over a century.270 In 1892, the Supreme Court declared that private 
property owners could not acquire full title to public trust lands held by 
the state under any circumstances.271 Throughout the twentieth cen-
tury, courts have restricted private citizens’ use of water,272 private land 
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owners’ ability to exclude the public from private property,273 and pri-
vate claims to the use of oil fields.274 In a 1988 dispute over oil reserves 
located under water, the Supreme Court declared that states recognize 
private rights in public trust lands “as they see fit.”275 Thus, even before 
Lucas, it was well established that the public trust doctrine placed re-
strictions on private citizens’ use of land,276 and that states were entitled 
to define the parameters of those restrictions.277 This history renders it 
even more predictable that the Florida Supreme Court would define 
certain restrictions on private property rights due to the public trust 
doctrine—and certainly makes it less unforeseeable.278 
 Although Justice Brennan never used the term background prin-
ciple, the fourteen-page analysis at the beginning of his unpublished 
dissenting opinion in Nollan satisfied all the Lucas factors necessary to 
demonstrate that the public trust doctrine was a background principle 
of California property law.279 Justice Brennan began the first draft by 
outlining how the public trust doctrine was incorporated as a funda-
mental part of California coastal law through adoption in the Califor-
nia Constitution in 1879, and embodiment in statutes.280 This history 
indicates that the public trust doctrine is a California state doctrine,281 
and that it is not “newly legislated or decreed.”282 
 Justice Brennan continued by outlining how California state courts 
have interpreted private rights pursuant to the public trust doctrine.283 
Not only had California courts previously found that private parties 
holding tidelands were “subject to an easement for the public trust . . . 
provid[ing] access thereto,” but also that “[t]he public uses to which 
tidelands are subject are sufficiently flexible to encompass changing 
public needs . . . .”284 Thus, Justice Brennan demonstrated that the 
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right to access along the beach is well established in California, as is the 
recognition by California courts that the trust is flexible and expan-
sive.285 Given this, the result achieved by the condition placed on the 
Nollans’ permit286 “no more than duplicate[d] the result that could 
have been achieved in the courts.”287 
 Furthermore, the consistent manner in which California courts 
have increasingly expanded the doctrine’s breadth suggests that the 
doctrine neither vacillates greatly nor is it applied ambiguously.288 Fi-
nally, because the public trust doctrine applies to all private owners of 
trust property, the doctrine applies equally to everyone.289 
 Thus, Justice Brennan demonstrated that coastal landowners never 
had a full title to their land because the public trust doctrine “in-
here[d] in the title itself.”290 This point is made explicit when Justice 
Brennan concluded the public trust doctrine analysis by stating: 
Thus, for more than a century California’s basic governing 
document has expressed a commitment to preserving the 
public’s ancient right of access to the sea. The State has de-
clared that the bundle of property rights enjoyed by property 
owners along the coast does not include the right to use their 
property in any way that might impede public access to the 
beach. California courts have consistently affirmed the fact 
that coastal property rights are so qualified.291 
This unpublished portion of Justice Brennan’s Nollan dissent adds fur-
ther support to the assertion that the public trust doctrine is a back-
ground principle.292 The analysis independently establishes the same 
criteria that later evolved into the model for determining what consti-
tuted a background principle.293 This adds further support to the con-
tention that the Stop the Beach Renourishment I decision, declaring the 
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public trust doctrine to be a background principle, was predictable.294 
Therefore, even if the Supreme Court had employed the expected ju-
dicial takings test in Stop the Beach Renourishment II—foreseeability— and 
finally addressed the public trust doctrine’s role in takings analysis, the 
Florida court in Stop the Beach Renourishment I clearly did not affect a 
judicial taking.295 
Conclusion 
 When the Supreme Court decided Stop the Beach Renourishment II, 
the Court once again failed to answer several questions that have 
plagued legal scholars for years. There was no consensus as to whether 
Fifth Amendment takings protections apply to the judiciary—a “judicial 
takings” doctrine. Also, the Court did not clarify the definition of a 
“background principle” as articulated in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Commission. Furthermore, the Court again evaded addressing whether 
or not the public trust doctrine plays a role in takings analysis. 
 This Note argues that the public trust doctrine should, and does, 
play a role in takings analysis. The doctrine satisfies all apparent criteria 
for a background principle under the Lucas model, and a substantial 
history of decisions, rendered both prior to and after Lucas, recognize 
that the public trust doctrine imposes limits on a private property 
owner’s title to trust resources. 
 Because the public trust doctrine is a background principle, the 
decision in Stop the Beach Renourishment I does not constitute a judicial 
taking under any standard, including that standard articulated in 
Hughes v. Washington. A judicial taking, as thus perceived, requires that a 
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decision be unreasonable and unpredictable given the relevant prece-
dents—or be unforeseeable. Even though the Supreme Court articu-
lated a novel judicial takings standard in this case—the “established 
property rights” standard—the decision would have been the same had 
they applied Hughes as expected. Despite the Court’s unwillingness to 
speak on this issue, the public trust doctrine is a background principle, 
so the decision in Stop the Beach Renourishment I was entirely foreseeable. 
The strength and longevity of the precedents establishing the public 
trust doctrine as a background principle are so strong that the Stop the 
Beach Renourishment I decision was not a judicial taking under any test. 
Ironically, even though the Court reached the correct result, the test 
for judicial takings offered in Stop the Beach Renourishment II was such a 
dramatic shift from all prior takings precedent, that, had the decision 
received a majority vote, it may have been a judicial taking in and of 
itself.296 
 
296 See Mulvaney, supra note 70, at 266 (stating that under the “established” standard, 
even recent landmark Supreme Court decisions would have been judicial takings, and Stop 
the Beach Renourishment II itself constitutes a judicial taking). 
